Taylor nodded. “Everyone’s the hero of their own story. Even traitors.”
“The other thing is that Odin had access to intelligence products, perhaps from other American or allied Intel agencies. So, he’s an Intel guy of some sort, maybe an analyst, maybe counterintelligence. All we know is that he’s military. Let’s say, for the sake of argument, he’s Army. He knows there’s a mole in the Stasi. How? Either the mole is communicating with someone else in Army intelligence, or Odin has sufficient rank and security clearance or sufficiently developed interagency and interbranch relationships that he knows he can get access. And even if Odin gets lucky and mole number one—Karl Liebnick—was communicating with Army intelligence, what are the chances that the other three moles in the Stasi were also going through Army Intel? They could have been in contact with Air Force or Navy intelligence, or the CIA, or someone in State Department Intel. But Odin manages to identify four double agents in seven years. That’s a hell of a track record. I think we are dealing with a high-ranking military intelligence officer. Colonel or above.”
“That would explain the self-importance.”
Brodie smiled. He continued, “We need to understand more about the Stasi foreign intelligence agency. The HVA. Set aside the docs from Berlin PD for now and research it. What role did the HVA play in state security? This report mentions the East German Army’s ‘offensive capabilities and strategic posture.’ What is that? What were they up to around this time, or what did our Intel people think they were up to? This report is the tip of an iceberg, and a lot of what used to be below the waterhas probably been declassified since 1989. So you should be able to find something.”
Taylor was quiet a moment. “Scott, are we investigating Harry’s murder? Or are we doing the job he never finished?”
Brodie looked at her. “They might be one and the same.”
CHAPTER 29
The Adlon’s lounge was getting busier and rowdier, thanks to a large crowd of British corporate conference types—judging by their lanyards and nametags—who were having a good time at the bar on the company’s dime. Brodie knew he could outspend them on taxpayer money if he didn’t get the call from Dombroski firing him.
Meanwhile, Brodie sipped his beer and resumed reading:
In February 1988, Odin contacted his handler with a concern. He demanded a meeting with Deputy Chief Heinrich Tauchert, to be held at a specific military training facility outside of Berlin. His demand was granted. Odin entered the GDR via East Berlin using false papers and a tourist pass. He proceeded to the training facility where he met with Deputy Tauchert, who reported that the meeting went well and satisfied Odin’s concerns.
During this visit, Odin had a brief interaction with visiting military officials from a client nation who were participating in a training program. Deputy Tauchert reported being surprised that Odin—who was fluent in German—spoke in English and identified himself to the foreign officials as an American defector. Deputy Tauchert considered Odin’s behavior to be reckless, and believed that it raised broader concerns about Odin’s commitment to strict security protocols.
Brodie stopped reading and passed Taylor the page he had just read. “I think I found what sent Harry looking for Colonel Qasim.”
Taylor read the page and handed it back to Brodie. “So, Harry read this report, and researched what military facilities in East Germany had been training foreign officials. He discovered the Iraq-Storkow connection, and maybe accessed now-declassified East German files to obtain the names of Iraqi military officials who were present at the Storkow training facility in 1988.”
“Right. And among those names he finds Colonel Tariq Qasim. Vance might have been able to exploit his own resources as a CID counterterrorism investigator to get information about Colonel Qasim’s activities and whereabouts in the following years, and he learned that Qasim resettled in Berlin after the fall of Saddam. But he couldn’t locate Qasim because the man had taken a new identity. So, suspecting that, Harry did what he’d probably done before and visited mosques in Berlin, maybe starting with Neukölln, looking for men with Qasim’s background.”
Taylor nodded. “But if Harry had access to declassified documents about this East German military facility in Storkow, wouldn’t he also have the names of East Germans who were present there? And wouldn’t those individuals be easier to locate, and perhaps more likely to be able to identify Odin?”
Brodie considered that, then replied, “These declassified documents that Vance got hold of would have redactions of the names of German citizens—for legal or civil liberties reasons—but the documents would not redact the names of Iraqi military officials. One way or another, Vance believed or suspected that Tariq Qasim was present at the Storkow facility at the same time as Odin, and that Tariq was still alive, and living in Berlin under a pseudonym. Maybe Harry had some suspects in mind for Odin and was going to show Qasim some photos he’d gotten from military personnel files. It was a long shot, but for Harry it was one worth taking.”
Instead, someone else took a long shot, right into Vance’s head. As for the Stasi report, it put Harry’s behavior in some context, but so far was producing no leads of its own.
Taylor said, “The report is vague on Odin’s reason for the meeting at Storkow. He had aconcernwhich wassatisfied.”
“Maybe in his official capacity as a U.S. Intel officer, Odin caught wind of something about Stasi operations that needed clarification orcorroboration. Maybe something that involved this Tauchert guy.”
Taylor typed on her tablet. “Heinrich Tauchert was the deputy head of the HVA. Before being promoted to deputy, he oversaw the Stasi’s military intelligence division, which worked alongside the National People’s Army’s own Intel service.” She looked up at Brodie. “He died two years ago.”
Brodie nodded. “The first mole, Karl Liebnick, was sharing Intel about the National People’s Army. Could be related. A joint military-Stasi operation.”
“Could be.”
“A joint operation that involves chemical or biological weapons.”
“Maybe.”
Brodie thought a moment and said, “Odin wants to help his Communist pals, but does not want to collude in a biological or chemical warfare attack on Western Europe. He demands this meeting with Tauchert at Storkow, so that he can get more information about the nature of the East German chem bio program, and the Stasi’s potential role in any kind of joint operation.”
“I think we’re getting a little ahead of ourselves.”
Possibly. But the fact that East Germany even possessed a biological and chemical warfare program was news to Brodie. And the program was developed and sophisticated enough to offer training to other countries like Iraq. Did Odin learn about this facility’s existence in the course of his official duties as a member of the U.S. military in West Berlin? If so, that might offer a hint as to who he was. Or had he been offered intelligence directly from someone within the Stasi that prompted his demand for the meeting at Storkow? This report was raising more questions than it was answering, and Brodie wondered how many of these questions Harry Vance had managed to answer before he was murdered.
Brodie continued reading:
In March of 1989, Odin resurfaced and reached out to his handler. While most communications over the years had been accomplished via dead drops, Odin now requested an in-person meeting at a location in West Berlin. The handler agreed to the face-to-face meeting, and afterward reported a disturbing encounter with the asset. Odin revealed that he had discovered another spy within the Ministry andwas in direct communication with this person. He refused to offer up the identity of the mole, or the nature of the intelligence this traitor was sharing with him. Odin contended that if he were to give over the name of the mole it might threaten to expose his own identity, as the mole knew—or suspected—Odin’s real name, or at least Odin’s position within the U.S. military, which could identify him. Odin also stated that the intelligence he had received from the Stasi traitor was so sensitive, and its continued secrecy so important, that he would not give this information to his handler. Instead, he would destroy the intelligence documents he was receiving, and ensure that the traitor remained in contact with him exclusively.
This arrangement was deemed unacceptable by leadership within the Ministry, who demanded to know the identity of the traitor, and the contents of the intelligence he was passing to Odin. Odin ultimately agreed to reveal the traitor’s name in exchange for a guarantee of East German residency for himself and one of his family members, along with a state pension. This guarantee was granted.
